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The Twenty-Sixth Amendment is commonly understood as lowering the
voting age to eighteen. However, a close look at the Amendment's language
and history indicates that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment does more than just
grant a right. Properly read, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment acts as an anti-
discrimination law similar to the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments. Accordingly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment possesses the power
not just to invalidate legislation that explicitly contravenes its purpose, but
also to neutralize facially neutral legislation that was enacted with a
discriminatory intent. Using Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
jurisprudence as a guide, this Comment proposes a framework for structuring
Twenty-Sixth Amendment claims against facially neutral legislation. It
argues that where claimants can show that a law was enacted for the purpose
of impeding the youth vote, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment should trigger strict
judicial scrutiny. It uses North Carolina's new voting legislation, the Voter
Information Verification Act, to illustrate how a group of students may
demonstrate that this facially neutral legislation was enacted for the purpose of
frustrating young and student voters.
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INTRODUCTION
As House Bill 589, or the Voter Information Verification Act (VIVA),
worked its way through the North Carolina Legislature, a group of
students gathered outside the office of the North Carolina Speaker of
the House to protest the bill.' "Why do you support a bill making it
more difficult for North Carolinians to vote?" one of the students
exclaimed.2 By the end of the night, six students had been arrested.
3
VIVA, which ends pre-registration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds, eliminates same-day registration, forbids out-of-precinct voting,4
prohibits the use of student IDs as voter identification, and restricts
the use of out-of-state licenses for the same,' has been described as
"the most sweeping anti-voter law in at least decades."'  This is
1. Saki Knafo, North Carolina Voter ID Law Targets Student Voters, Too,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/
north-carolina-voter-id n_3654826.html.
2. Id.
3. See id. (reporting that over 900 people have been arrested while protesting
the legislation and several other items since the bill has been proposed).
4. In its ruling on October 1, 2014, the Fourth Circuit issued a preliminary
injunction blocking the provisions of the Voter Information Verification Act (VIVA) that
ended same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting. League of Women Voters v.
North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
Several days later, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction, but gave no reasoning as to
its decision. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014).
5. On June 22, 2015, Governor McCrory signed into law several modifications
to VIVA's voter identification provisions. See Rick Hasen, Big News: Changes Made
to North Carolina Voter ID Law, ELECTION LAw BLOG (June 18, 2015, 1:13 PM),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=73591. Under the new modifications, voters lacking
the proper photo identification may cast a provisional ballot if they provide their
birthdate, last four digits of their Social Security number, and execute an affidavit
affirming that at least one of seven enumerated "reasonable impediments" has
prevented them from obtaining proper identification. See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 103
(listing these "reasonable impediments" as lack of transportation, illness or disability,
lack of documents needed to obtain photo identification, work schedule, family
responsibilities, lost or stolen photo identification, or photo identification applied
for, but not yet received). While the trial proceeded as scheduled in July 2015,Judge
Thomas Schroeder set aside arguments on the identification provisions until a later
date. Samantha Lachman, North Carolina Just Relaxed Its Voter ID Law, But Will Voters
Get the Memo? HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/ north-carolina-voter-id-law_55ad57b2e4b0caf721 b3935f.
6. See Knafo, supra note 1 (quoting Richard Hasen, a law professor at the
University of California, Irvine and the author of THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA
2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION). While VIVA has been regaled as the Nation's most
restrictive voting law, several other states have also enacted restrictive voting
legislation in recent years. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 5.02 (6m) (2014) (requiring voters
to present either a Wisconsin driver's license, military ID, U.S. passport, tribal ID,
naturalization certificate, or a student ID if it bears signature, issuance date,
2015] 1505
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especially troublesome for young voters, as their relative inexperience
with voting procedures leaves them particularly susceptible to
changes in electoral law.7 Recognizing that North Carolina is home
to at least one hundred twenty-five colleges8 and hundreds of
thousands of postsecondary students,9 some view North Carolina's
new voting scheme as an attempt to keep student voices out of the
governmentl-voices that are constitutionally protected. " Seven
students have joined a lawsuit challenging the legislation, arguing
that VIVA's provisions violate their Twenty-Sixth Amendment rights.'2
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment prohibits the federal government or
any state government from enacting a law that would prevent or
frustrate the ability of those aged eighteen and over to vote."3
Despite the fervor surrounding the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment in 1971," it has received very little attention.5 Perhaps
expiration date, and proof of enrollment).
7. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES
RELATED TO STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAwS 52-54 (2014) (finding that voters
between nineteen- and twenty-three-years-old and voters who had been registered for
less than a year were more affected by Kansas's and Tennessee's change in voter
identification laws than voters between forty-four and fifty-three years old).
8. Colleges in North Carolina, CAPPEX, http://www.cappex.com/colleges/states/
North-Carolina (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
9. Amended Complaint at 9, N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997
F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-CV-00660). Texas similarly forbids the
use of student IDs for voting, despite having a postsecondary student population of
over one million. MaxJ. Rosenthal, Texans Allowed to Show Gun Permits But Not Student ]Ds
at VotingBooth, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
11 / 15/texans-gun-permits-student-ids-voting-in_1095530.html.
10. See Tyler Kingkade & Saki Knafo, North Carolina Voter ID Law Targets College
Students, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
07/30/north-carolina-voter-id-students n 3676413.html (referencing Diana Kasdan,
senior counsel at New York University School of Law's Brennan Center of Justice,
who remarked that the legislation is "clearly targeting student voters").
11. Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105, 1105 (1979) (mem.) (holding that
students have the right to vote in the community where they attend school).
12. Amended Complaint at 2-3, N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-CV-00660).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI ("The right of citizens of the United States,
who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of age.").
14. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment followed a period of intense youth activism and a
failed attempt to extend the Voting Rights Act to lower the age of eligibility to vote in federal
and state elections to eighteen. See 117 CONG. EG. 7532, 7543 (1971) (statement of Rep.
Matsunaga) (recognizing that student unrest and violence in the years surrounding the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment reflects concern for "the important issues of our time").
15. See Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J.
1506 [Vol. 64:1503
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this is because the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is generally viewed as a
"narrowly tailored response to the rise of youth activism in the
1960s."'" However, such a dismissive view discounts the plain
language and history of the Amendment, both of which suggest that
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment deserves a much more significant place
in our constitutional jurisprudence. 7 Furthermore, the protections
provided by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment are especially salient
today, as at least twenty-two states have passed legislation curtailing
voting rights since 2010.18 Several of these laws face legal
challenges.9  By understanding the strength of Twenty-Sixth
Amendment protections, a new voice emerges in the controversy
surrounding this new wave of stricter voting laws.
This Comment will argue that where facially neutral voting
legislation works to discriminate against young or student voters,
courts should employ a strict scrutiny standard to review claims
brought under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. It then proposes that,
in line with Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence,
those bringing a Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim should use
1168, 1170-71 (2012) (pointing out that there has only been one Supreme Court case
addressing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and only a handful of lower court cases).
16. Id.
17. See id. at 1171-72 (recognizing that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was not
written as a simple age limit for disenfranchisement). But see David A. Strauss, The
Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARVARD L. REV. 1457, 1488-89 (2001)
(arguing that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was largely a cost-saving mechanism and,
therefore, should not be read broadly).
18. Jerry H. Goldfeder & Myrna Phrez, Voting Restrictions: From Statehouses to Courts,
N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjoumal.com/id=1202674404316/
Voting-Restrictions-From-Statehouses-to-Courts. For example, in 2014, Tennessee
restricted the types of identification that may be presented at the polls to Tennessee
driver's licenses, U.S. passports, photo IDs issued by the Tennessee Department of
Safety and Homeland Security, photo IDs issued by the federal or Tennessee state
government, U.S. Military photo ID, or Tennessee handgun carry permits. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-7-112(c) (2014); Elections, Voter Identification Requirements, TENN. DEP'T
OF STATE, https://www.tn.gov/sos/election/photolD.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
Expressly excluded are college student IDs, photo IDs issued by city or county
governments, and any photo ID issued by another state. Id.
19. See Jaime Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby County v. Holder?,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/
07/07/how-has-voting-changed-since-shelby-county-v-holder (stating that new voting
laws have restricted the right to vote in twenty-two states, and such laws are facing
legal action in Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and
Wisconsin). Opponents of these stricter voting laws argue that the "only effect will be
limiting the right to vote-mostly among low-income and minority voters who may
not own government identification or have enough flexibility with their
employment" to comply with the new rules. Id.
2015] 1507
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disproportionate effects, historical background, administrative
history, departures from normal procedure, and any other relevant
information to evidence a discriminatory purpose. This Comment
then uses North Carolina's new voting legislation to illustrate how
challengers of facially neutral laws should use such direct and
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that the legislation was
enacted with a discriminatory purpose. Part I provides background
information about the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and
how it has been interpreted, as well as the history behind the passage of
VIVA and its controversy. Part II.A. argues that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment should be read as an anti-discrimination amendment, thus
triggering strict scrutiny when legislation or actions were enacted with a
discriminatory purpose. Part II.B. proposes a framework for evaluating
claims brought under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, using plain
language and historical similarities between the Twenty-Sixth and
Fifteenth Amendments to support the proposal. Part II.C. argues that
VIVA's background, legislative history, and plain language evidence an
intent to discourage student voters in violation of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment. Part III recommends that, where a challenged legislation
is facially neutral, a court should evaluate a Twenty-Sixth Amendment
claim as it would a Fifteenth Amendment claim, and, therefore, apply
strict scrutiny upon finding that Twenty-Sixth Amendment rights have
been burdened. Part IV concludes by finding that under such a
standard, VIVA violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
I. THE RISE OF THE RESTLESS
A. The Histoy of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
In the 1960s, the United States exploded with youth and student
activism, demanding civil rights, an end to the war in Vietnam, and
most importantly, the right to vote. Armed with the argument "old
enough to fight, old enough to vote," activists demanded that the
right to vote be extended to eighteen-year-olds.20  By 1970, the
overwhelming power and influence of these young advocates
compelled legislators to amend the Voting Rights Act2' in order to
20. See Records of Rights Vote: "Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Vote," NAT'L
ARcIVs (Nov. 13, 2013), http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p=12964 (recognizing
that the slogan "old enough to fight, old enough to vote" was first heard during
World War II, but picked up speed during the Vietnam War).
21. The Voting Rights Act is a piece of federal legislation, originally passed in
1965, which sought to strengthen the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition on the
denial and abridgement of the right to vote based on race. See History of Federal Voting
1508 [Vol. 64:1503
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enfranchise those at least eighteen years of age.2' Just months
later, however, the Supreme Court invalidated this legislation in
part, reasoning that it was beyond the scope of Congress to
enfranchise eighteen-year-olds in state and local elections.
23
Determined to incorporate youthful ideals into the electoral
process, Congress went to work on a constitutional amendment
that would accomplish what Title III of the Voting Rights Act
could not.2" The result was the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
Of utmost concern to some legislators debating the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment was the impact enfranchisement would have on
college towns, where eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds constitute a
significant portion of the population.25 Not surprisingly, in the
years following the enactment of the Amendment, many Twenty-
Sixth Amendment claims were brought by college students
alleging age discrimination in voting practices.26
In 1979, the Supreme Court weighed in on the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, holding that college students have the right to vote in the
Rights Laws, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/intro/intro
_b.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
22. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, tit. III, 84 Stat. 314,
318 (1970); see also S. REP. No. 92-26 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 931, 936 ("The
anachronistic voting-age limitation tends to alienate them from systematic political
processes and to drive them into a search for an alternative, sometimes violent, means to
express their frustrations over the gap between the nation's ideals and actions."); Records
of Rights Vote: "Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Vote," NAT'L ARCHIVES (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p=12964 (observing that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment was ratified faster than any other constitutional amendment).
23. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970) (finding that while Congress
may lower the minimum voting age for national elections, its attempt to do the same for
state and local elections impinges on the powers reserved to the states in the Constitution).
24. Proponents of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment saw college-aged youth as an
increasingly important sector of society and sought to capture their ideals in the
electoral process. See 117 Cong. Rec. 7532, 7533-64 (1971) (reporting that capturing
youthful idealism was a primary goal of Congress).
25. See id. at 7538 (statement of Rep. Michel) ("For goodness sakes, we could
have these transients actually controlling the elections, voting city councils and
mayors in or out of office in a town in which they have a dominant voice."). Take,
for example, the city of Boulder, Colorado, home of the University of Colorado.
Nearly one-third of the city's population is between eighteen and twenty-four years
old, "highlighting the effect of the university on city demographics." BOULDER ECON.
COUNCIL, MARKET PROFILE (Apr. 2015), http://bouldereconomiccouncil.org/bec-
publications/market-profile-april-2015. The city's median age is 27.7 years old-
almost ten years younger than the national median. Id.
26. See, e.g., Worden v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 294 A.2d 233, 234-35 (N.J.
1972) (challenging a state law that imposed extra questions on college students
seeking to register to vote in their college community).
15092015]
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communities where they attend college.27 In so holding, the Court
affirmed several lower courts' invalidation of state and local laws
imposing residency requirements and presumptions on college
students.28 However, courts have by no means held that students have
an absolute right to vote. The Supreme Court has upheld various
durational residency requirements and registration deadlines,29 and
has concluded that states have a legitimate interest in making sure
voters are "bona fide" residents of the state.3 Moreover, in 2008, the
Supreme Court found that voter identification requirements were
constitutional,31 reasoning that state interests in detecting and
deterring voter fraud were sufficiently weighty to justify the even-
handed limitations placed on voters by requiring photo identification
for in-person voting.32 While all of these rulings may affect the ability
27. See Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105, 1105 (1979) (mem.) (concluding
that a requirement that college dormitory residents establish that they intend to
remain in the community after graduation before they could be registered to vote
violated the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
28. See, e.g., Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1971) (en banc)
(holding that state practice of requiring unmarried students to register at their
parent's home was unconstitutional).
29. See Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686-87 (1973) (per curiam) (concluding
that Georgia's fifty-day registration deadline is constitutional, although noting that such
a long deadline touches the outer limits of constitutionality). But see Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 347-50, 360 (1972) (finding Tennessee's one-year durational
residency requirement unconstitutional, but acknowledging that a state could
demonstrate a compelling need to require thirty days of residency prior to voting).
30. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 347-48 (asserting that a thirty-day registration deadline is
sufficient to further the state's goal of ensuring all voters are actually state residents, and
lengthy durational residency requirements are not necessary in accomplishing this goal);
Carrngton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1965) (making it clear that while states may take
efforts to ensure that voters are bona fide residents of the state, states may not use class or
status to create presumptions of non-residency). In Carrington, the Court also asserted
that "fencing out" a sector of the population because of the way they vote or the effect
they will have on elections was unconstitutional. Id. at 93-94.
31. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194, 202-03 (2008)
(upholding Indiana's identification requirements, despite a complete lack of
evidence that in-person voter fraud has ever occurred in Indiana). But see
Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *55 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (finding that Pennsylvania's identification requirements
"disproportionately burden[] low-income and homeless voters, who are less likely to
have a compliant ID" and would face difficulty obtaining compliant identification).
32. While Crawford established that states have a legitimate interest in protecting the
integrity of the electoral process and endorsed photo identification as one method for
achieving this goal, the Court did not put forth a per se rule authorizing all voter
identification laws. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202 (confining its opinion to Indiana's voter
law); see also Matt Apuzzo, StudentsJoining Battle to Upend Laws on Voter ID, N.Y. TisES (July 5,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/201 4/07/06/us/college-students-claim-voter-id-laws-
1510 [Vol. 64:1503
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of students to vote, the cases in no way detract from the premise that
students may not be subjected to different voting requirements than
the rest of the population. Moreover, all of these cases were brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and
presented no Twenty-Sixth Amendment claims."
While most courts agree that legislation that explicitly subjects
college students to more stringent registration requirements based
on their status as students violates their Twenty-Sixth Amendment
rights,"4 it is less clear how to determine when facially neutral
legislation may violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted such a situation
in Waigren v. Howes,"5 where students challenged an action that set
a local election date during a time when most students would be
on winter holiday.36 The court, recognizing the lack of Twenty-
Sixth Amendment case law, suggested that the proper analytical
approach would be similar to the method used in evaluating
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment claims.7  The court
reasoned that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, which
enfranchised African Americans and women respectively,38 mirror
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in language and purpose, yet have
much more case law to guide courts in evaluation.39
discriminate-based-on-age.html?_r=2 (observing that the details of other voter identification
laws and how such laws are implemented may be subject tojudicial scrutiny).
33. See Fish, supra note 15, at 1231 ("There is no strong anti-age-classification
norm in current Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and distinctions based on
age are only subject to rational basis review.").
34. See, e.g., Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1971) (en banc)
(holding that the presumption that college students are domiciliaries of their
parents' residence violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment). But see Levy v. Scranton,
780 F. Supp. 897, 901 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that while the subjective intent of
some of the legislators in passing voting restrictions impermissibly targeted students,
this "does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that this subjective intent was a
motivating factor on the part of the entire legislature to enact this bill").
35. 482 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1973).
36. Id. at 97.
37. See id. at 100-01 (recognizing that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments served as models for the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
38. The Fifteenth Amendment declares that neither the federal government nor
any state government may pass a law that infringes upon the right to vote based on
race. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Similarly, the Nineteenth Amendment prohibits any
law that inhibited the right to vote based on sex. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
39. Howes, 482 F.2d at 101. The court noted that the Fifteenth Amendment, in
particular, has a considerable amount of guiding case law. Id.
2015] 1511
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While case law on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is limited, the
cases on point demonstrate that courts, including the Supreme
Court, show little hesitation in thwarting explicit attempts to hamper
student voting. Although these holdings in no way create an absolute
right to vote, such holdings do suggest a continuing commitment to
protecting the youth vote. In analogizing the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment to the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, the First
Circuit suggested that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was indeed an
anti-discrimination statute, and its reasoning also illustrated that the
Amendment could create a claim against a facially neutral statute.
B. Using the Ffteenth Amendment o Understand the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment invalidates legislation that denies or
abridges the right to vote because of race or sex, and mandates strict
scrutiny where legislation, although neutral on its face, was enacted
with a discriminatory intent.4" Additionally, the Fifteenth
Amendment has a broad scope; its protections extend beyond voting
and its "paradigmatic protected classes."'" The Fifteenth
Amendment in particular has been read to invalidate even
"simpleminded modes of discrimination" that may leave the "abstract
right to vote" intact.42 This language first appeared in Lane v.
Wilson,"3 a Fifteenth Amendment case that involved a statute, which,
while neutral on its face, had the practical effect of enfranchising all
white voters while requiring all would-be African-American voters to
register within a twelve-day period or risk losing their right to the
franchise forever." By invalidating a race-neutral statute because it
40. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (requiring strict scrutiny
wherever race is the overriding force in the redistricting process); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (explaining that the Fifteenth Amendment
"has repeatedly been construed.., to invalidate state voting qualifications or
procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice"), abrogated by
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
41. Fish, supra note 15, at 1175; see United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 522 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that white voters have standing to
challenge a redistricting plan under the claim that it violates their Fifteenth Amendment
rights), affd sub nom. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977). The Nineteenth Amendment has a similarly broad scope. See Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (recognizing that the Nineteenth
Amendment has sex equality implications for constitutional questions other than voting).
42. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 268-71. The challenged statute required anyone who hadn't
registered to vote in 1914 to register to vote within a twelve-day period if they were to
vote in 1916. Id. While the legislation made no explicit mention of race, most
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produced unequal access to the polls,45 the Supreme Court illustrated
that the Fifteenth Amendment had the power to invalidate legislation
that is neither explicitly discriminatory nor a complete bar to the
exercise of the franchise, if the legislation had the practical effect of
discouraging or disenfranchising African-American voters.4" In
Howes, the First Circuit concluded that a similar strength could be
associated with Twenty-Sixth Amendment claims.47
However, simply stating that the Fifteenth Amendment invalidates
legislation that handicaps the ability to vote based on race
oversimplifies the analysis needed to determine when a Fifteenth
Amendment violation occurs. In 1980, the Supreme Court decided
City of Mobile v. Bolden,8 clarifying that where the challenged
African Americans had not been allowed to register in 1914, and thus, by default, fell
into the group that only had a twelve-day registration period in 1916. Id.
45. See id. at 276-77 (reasoning that a twelve-day registration period was too "cabined
and confined" of a time limit to allow someone to assert their constitutional rights).
46. Lower courts have used this standard to overturn various types of voting-related
legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Bibb Cnty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 222 F. Supp.
493, 494-95, 498-99 (M.D. Ga. 1962) (finding that polling stations separated by race
violate the Fifteenth Amendment because, even though the right to vote remained intact,
distinctions based on race adversely affect public interest and discourage participation);
United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 678-79 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (holding that
Alabama's voting laws violated the Fifteenth Amendment because mechanisms such as
writing tests and time-consuming qualification forms preyed upon the disparities between
white and black citizens and discouraged black citizens from voting), affd, 304 F.2d 583
(5th Cir. 1962), affdpercuriam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
47. See Walgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1973) ("The Fifteenth
Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination.
It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the
franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain
unrestricted as to race." (quoting Lane, 307 U.S. at 275)). The Supreme Court of
California also endorsed this perspective, quoting the same excerpt from Lane v.
Wilson and using it to reason that requiring unmarried voters to register at their
parents' place of residence acted as an impermissible barrier to the right to vote on
account of age. Jolicouer v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 4, 12 (Cal. 1971) (en banc). While
the legislation in Jolicouer was not facially neutral, the case is relevant insofar as it
demonstrates that more than one court has approved the use of Fifteenth Amendment
jurisprudence to evaluate a Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim. See id. at 3 (noting that
registrars refused to register unmarried minors pursuant to the California Attorney
General's statement that the residence of an unmarried minor will normally be his
parents' home, regardless of where the minors are presently living). However, the First
Circuit did not ultimately conduct a thorough analysis under this standard. SeeWalgren v.
Bd. of Selectmen, 519 F.2d 1364, 1368 (1st Cir. 1975) (concluding that the county
officials made a good faith effort to find a mutually acceptable election date and,
therefore, the election date was not intended to discriminate against students).
48. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion) superseded by statute, Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, as recognized in
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legislation is racially neutral, plaintiffs must show that the legislation
was enacted with a discriminatory purpose." In Bolden, African-
American citizens of Mobile, Alabama alleged that the city's at-large
method of electing its commissioners violated the Fifteenth
Amendment,50 citing as evidence the lack of any African-American
individuals on the City Commission, despite the city's significant
black population.5' The election scheme was racially neutral.52 The
Supreme Court upheld the city's election scheme, concluding that
where the challenged legislation is racially neutral, disproportionate
effects alone are insufficient to establish a claim of
unconstitutionality.53 Although the Supreme Court contended that
disproportionate impact is not dispositive, it reasoned that the impact
of legislation-whether it affects one race more heavily than
another-may be used to infer a discriminatory purpose. In so
ruling, the Supreme Court equated the facially neutral Fifteenth
Amendment analysis with Fourteenth Amendment analysis:
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
49. Id. at 62. In its reasoning, the Court borrowed from Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, which similarly requires discriminatory intent to show an
equal protection violation. SeeVill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 269 (1977) (holding that, without more, authorities' refusal to
change zoning from single-family to multi-family is not enough to show an equal
protection violation, even though the decision disproportionately affects minorities);
see also Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287-88
(M.D. Ala. 2013) (finding that although amendments to the Voting Rights Act have
lessened the burden of proof for plaintiffs, the Fifteenth Amendment still requires a
discriminatory purpose), vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
50. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58.
51. Id. at 58, 64-65.
52. Id. at 59-60, 62.
53. Id. at 73-76 (reasoning that a lack of black representatives in city council did
not tend to show that the plaintiffs' right to vote had been purposefully denied or
abridged on account of race); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56, 58
(1964) (upholding a congressional reapportionment statute where plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the legislature was motivated by racial considerations).
54. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); see
also Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that
"[rlacial discrimination need only be one purpose, and not even a primary purpose, of
an official act in order for a violation of the ... Fifteenth Amendment[] to occur").
The First Circuit did not discuss this aspect of Fifteenth Amendment analysis when it
evaluated the validity of the election date in Howes. SeeWalgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d 95,
101 (1st Cir. 1973) (failing to mention that where facially neutral legislation is at issue,
plaintiffs must demonstrate the action had discriminatory intent).
55. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (recognizing that the
demonstration of intention is necessary under both Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment claims); see also Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 876, 880 (S.D. Ala.
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Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,56 which involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a
city's zoning laws, provides a thorough review of some of the
relevant factors courts consider when determining whether a facially
neutral action is constitutionally permissible.57 In Arlington Heights,
the Court explained that plaintiffs may evidence an action's
discriminatory effects, its historical background, the sequence of
events that led to the action, the presence or absence of departures
from normal procedures or substantive criteria, and the action's
legislative or administrative history to demonstrate that the action
or legislation had a discriminatory purpose.5" Moreover, where an
action or legislation is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"
courts will often find a discriminatory intent.
59
Following the First Circuit's reasoning in Howes, a Twenty-Sixth
Amendment claim brought in opposition to a facially neutral action
or piece of legislation would be evaluated under the same framework
as a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a facially neutral action.
6
0
Accordingly, where challengers of a voting law can use that law's
legislative history, practical effects, and surrounding events to
evidence that the law was enacted to discriminate against young or
student voters, the law should receive strict scrutiny.
1949) affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (using the same framework to evaluate Fifteenth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims).
56. 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977).
57. Id. at 267-68.
58. Id.; Taylor v. Haywood Cnty., 544 F. Supp. 1122, 1133 (E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(recognizing that, although plaintiffs must show a discriminatory intent in order to
prevail on a Fifteenth Amendment claim, an invidious discriminatory purpose may
often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 298 n.20 (1987) (recognizing that contemporaneous historical evidence
has "probative value" in determining whether an action had discriminatory intent);
Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (mem.) (finding the sequence of events that led to the
legislation relevant in demonstrating a discriminatory intent); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.
Supp. 3d 627, 699-700 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (reasoning that demographic shifts may be
relevant in determining whether there was discriminatory intent).
59. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993)
(ruling that that redistricting legislation was so bizarre that it was unexplainable on
grounds other than race); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1915)
(concluding that a grandfather clause that had the practical effect of enfranchising only
white voters had no discernible purpose other than to disenfranchise black voters).
60. Walgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1973).
2015] 1515
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C. The Relevance of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment Today
OnJune 25, 2013 the Supreme Court released its decision in Shelby
County v. Holder,6 1 which invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights
Act (VRA)62 reasoning that the type of racial discrimination that had
motivated and sustained Section 4 no longer existed.6 3 Section 4
provided the enforcement mechanism for Section 5 of the VRA,
which requires states with a history of discrimination to obtain
approval from the federal government before making changes to
their election laws.64 This included North Carolina.65 The day after
the Court's decision in Shelby County, North Carolina began pursuing
drastic voting reform.66  Several weeks later, the North Carolina
Senate produced a fifty-seven page piece of legislation called the
Voter Information Verification Act.67 The Act imposes strict voter
identification requirements, diminishes early voting opportunities,
ends same-day registration, prohibits out-of-precinct voting, and
eliminates pre-registration for high school students.'c Proponents of
VIVA provide that the Act ensures administrative efficiency and
prevents voter fraud, while opponents argue the legislation was
enacted to suppress young and minority voting.6"9
North Carolina's new draconian set of voting laws surprised many,
as the state's previous voting laws were so successful in increasing
voter participation. In 1991, North Carolina had one of the lowest
voter participation rates in the country, ranking forty-seventh out of
61. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2612 (2013).
62. Id. at 2631; see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting
Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/
supreme-court-ruling.html?pagewanted=all&_r=l& (reporting that Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act required states and political subdivisions with a history of
discrimination to obtain federal preclearance before enacting new voting laws).
63. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (asserting that Congress is responsible for
ensuring that "the legislation it passes to remedy [racial discrimination in
voting] ... speaks to current conditions").
64. Fuller, supra note 19.
65. Id.
66. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242 (4th Cir.
2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
67. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-166.13 (2013).
68. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-166.13 (voter identification requirements); id. §
163-82.23 (elimination of teenage preregistration); id. § 163-82.6(c) (elimination of
same-day registration); id. § 163-227.2 (reduction of early voting); Apuzzo, supra note
32 (reporting that students also cite other government efforts, distinct from VIVA, as
evidence that officials wish to impede student voting).
69. Apuzzo, supra note 32.
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the fifty states."' In response to this dismal statistic, the legislature
enacted measures to increase voter participation over the next
decade.7 They worked; by 2012, North Carolina boasted one of the
highest rates of voter participation.72 Furthermore, cases of voter
fraud remained very low. 73  Despite these promising results, the
North Carolina Legislature, led by Republicans,4 sought a drastic
overhaul of the state's voting laws following the Supreme Court's
decision in Shelby County.75 While the bill predated the Shelby County
decision, the original version of the bill merely sought to require
some form of photo identification for in-person voting.7" The bill was
set aside for months and only saw rapid action after the Supreme
Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. 77 In fact, the day
after the decision came down in Shelby County, Senator Thomas
Apodaca, Republican Chairman of the Rules Committee, publicly stated,
"So now we can go with the full bill." 78 It was at that time that stricter ID
requirements emerged: student IDs were prohibited and stringent
restrictions were placed on out-of-state licenses.79 Additionally, the bill
70. Amended Complaint at 9, N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997
F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13 CV 00660).
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Press Release, Democracy N.C., Republicans, African Americans, Women
and Senior Post the Highest Voter Turnout Rate in North Carolina 1 (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://democracy-nc.org/downloads/NCVoterTumout20l2PRpdf (reporting that in the
2012 presidential elections 68.3 percent of registered voters in North Carolina cast ballots).
73. See Widespread Voter Fraud Not an Issue in NC, Data Shows, WNCN (July 29, 2013),
http://thevotingnews.com/widespread-voter-fraud-not-an-issue-in-north-carolina-
data-shows-wncn (stating that in the 2012 elections voter fraud allegations accounted
for only 0.00174 percent of ballots cast).
74. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322,
335 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (stating that the House Committee on Elections is
chaired by a Republican).
75. See id. at 335-36 (noting that VIVA went from being a relatively short document
that clarified voter identification requirements to a fifty-seven page piece of legislation).
76. SeeAmended Complaint at 10, N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory,
997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13 CV 00660) (arguing that the original
bill contained no restrictions on student IDs or out-of-state licenses); see also McCrory,
997 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (reporting that the original bill consisted almost exclusively of
an implementation of a comparatively non-restrictive voter identification program).
77. Amended Complaint at 11, McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (No. 1:13 CV
00660); see also League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 242-43
(4th Cir. 2014) (suggesting that the reason the Legislature took no action until after
the Shelby County decision is because proponents of the amended bill knew it would
not pass federal preclearance), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
78. McCroy, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
79. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-166.13 (stating that out-of-state licenses are
accepted only if the holder had registered to vote in North Carolina within
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eliminated preregistration for high school students, cut back early voting
days, ended same-day registration, prohibited out-of-precinct voting, and
terminated the discretion of county boards of election to keep polls
open an extra hour on Election Day.0
Lawyers for seven college students joined the NAACP, the American
Civil Liberties Union, and the Department of Justice in seeking
injunctive relief from VIVA in the District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina."1 The complaint argued that VIVA impermissibly
infringes on the rights of young voters under the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment and sought a preliminary injunction pending a full trial.8 2
After a four-day trial, the Honorable Thomas Schroeder of the
Middle District of North Carolina denied the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief."s In his 125-page decision, Judge Schroeder found
that, although the complaint stated plausible claims and should be
permitted to proceed to litigation, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate
that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm, which is a prerequisite
for preliminary injunctive relief.8 4 His opinion does not contain a
ninety days of the election).
80. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
81. Amended Complaint at 2, McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (No. 1:13 CV 00660);
Hunter Schwarz, Justice Department Sues North Carolina Over Voter ID Law, WASH. POST
(July 7, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/07/07/
jtstice-department-sues-north-carolina-over-voter-id-law. Similar voting laws are being
challenged in several other states, most notably Wisconsin and Texas; see also Jeffery
Toobin, Freedom Summer, 2015, NEw YORKER (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/freedom-summer-2015 (reporting
that, on emergency appeal, the Supreme Court struck down Wisconsin voter
identification law while upholding the Texas voter identification law, but reasoning that
this had more to do with the laws' implementation than their substance). See generally
Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding Texas's new voting regime
unconstitutional); Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 862-63 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(concluding that the burden a photo identification law places on the population
outweighs the state's interest in preventing voter impersonation), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th
Cir. 2014), reh'gdenied, 773 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).
82. Amended Complaint at 2-3, McCroy, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (No. 1:13 CV 00660).
83. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
84. Id.; see Richard Fausset, Judge Backs New Limits on North Carolina Voting, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/us/judge-in-north-
carolina-upholds-201 3-voting-law.html?re f=politics&_r=0 (noting that Judge
Schroeder acknowledged that, given North Carolina's history of discrimination in
voting practices, residents have reason to be wary of changes in voting law). But see
Ari Berman, Hundreds of Voters are Disenfranchised by North Carolina's New Voting
Restrictions, NATION (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/181566/hundreds-
voters-disenfranchised-north-carolinas-new-voting-restrictions# (referencing a review
by Democracy N.C. that reported 454 voters could not successfully cast their ballots
in North Carolina's primary due to the new law, including at least one student).
1518 [Vol. 64:1503
THE YOUNG AND THE RESTLESS
thorough analysis of the students' claims, however, because the
plaintiffs brought the claim as ten individuals rather than as a class."s
Judge Schroeder reasoned that if the plaintiffs wished to continue the
litigation as individuals, they must show that they themselves are likely
to suffer irreparable harm before trial.8" The plaintiffs appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, which heard the case on September 25, 2014.87
On October 1, 2014, in a 2-1 ruling, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction as to VIVA's
elimination of same-day voter registration and the prohibition on
counting out-of-precinct ballots.88  However, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction
regarding the elimination of teenage preregistration, the shortening
of the early voting period, and the restrictions on voter identification,
reasoning that, although the plaintiffs may ultimately succeed at the
full trial, they have not shown they will suffer irreparable harm in
these respects before the trial in 2015." North Carolina filed an
emergency petition to the Supreme Court,90 and on October 8, 2014,
the Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit's preliminary injunction
on same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting.91 The majority
did not offer any reasoning.12  Despite the plaintiffs' inability to
secure a preliminary injunction, observers predict that the plaintiffs
will likely have a strong case at the full trial,9 3 as VIVA is considered to
be one of the toughest voting restrictions in decades.9"
85. See McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (noting that all the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment cases cited to the court had been brought as class actions).
86. Id.
87. Appeals Court Sets Quick Date on State's Voting Law, WITN (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.witn.com/home/headlines/Appeals-Court-Sets-Quick-Date-On-States-
Voting-Law-274517581 .html.
88. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248-49 (4th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
89. Id.
90. Rick Hasen, Breaking: North Carolina Files Emergency #SCOTUS Petition in Same-
Day Voting, Precinct Voting Case: Analysis, ELECTION LAW BLOC (Oct. 2, 2014, 1:47 PM),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=66256.
91. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014).
92. Lyle Denniston, Court Allows North Carolina Voting Limits, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 8, 2014, 7:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/court-allows-
north-carolina-voting-limits.
93. Id.
94. Id. Compare 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381, with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.043 (West
2014) (requiring photo identification for in-person voting, but allowing several forms
of identification, such as debit or credit cards, retirement center identifications,
neighborhood association identification, or public assistance identification), and
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At a minimum, North Carolina's new voting legislation demonstrates
that its proponents are simply apathetic to the youth vote. However,
the extent of the new law's prohibitions and restrictions, coupled with
the law's legislative history, may suggest that it was enacted specifically
to make student voting more difficult. Such a discriminatory purpose
would violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE RESTLESS: HOW THE TWENTY-SIXTH
AMENDMENT COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN VOTING LAWS TODAY
A. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Should be Read as an Anti-Discrimination
Amendment, Giving it the Power to Trigger Strict Scrutiny in Response to
Facially Neutral Laws that Deliberately Frustrate Student Voting
Nearly every court confronted with a Twenty-Sixth Amendment
claim commented that there exists sparse guidance on how to evaluate
and analyze such claims.95 While case law clearly demonstrates that
laws containing facial discrimination are unconstitutional,96 no court
has resolved the power of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to neutralize
facially neutral action that impedes youth voter participation. Unlike
race and gender, age is generally not afforded strict scrutiny.7
However, at least one court has reasoned that the history and text of
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment indicates that the Amendment should
be evaluated under some form of heightened scrutiny.98
ALA. CODE § 17-9-30 (2014) (requiring photo identification but permitting employee
identification cards, tribal identification cards, or student identification from a
public or private university or technical college), and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-261
(2014) (stating only that voters must be able to show a preprinted form of
identification displaying elector's name and either his address, signature, or photo).
95. See, e.g., Walgren v. Bd. of Selectmen, 519 F.2d 1364, 1367 (1st Cir. 1975)
(acknowledging that few cases have been decided under the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, creating analysis problems for the court).
96. See generally Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1106, 1106 (1979) (mem.)
(holding that legislation that distinguishes students from the rest of the population
with respect to voting procedure violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
97. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 307 (1976)
(rejecting a claim that Massachusetts's mandatory retirement age for police officers
violated their right to equal protection). See generally Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 215 (recognizing and discussing the widely-held conclusion that
classifications based on age do not offend equal protection guarantees).
98. See Bd. of Selectmen, 519 F.2d at 1367 (finding it "difficult to believe" that the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment provided no special protections for young voters).
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1. The plain language of the Twent-Sixth Amendment indicates that it should be
read as an anti-discrimination amendment capable of tiggeyring strict scrutiny
The plain language of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment does not simply
convey a right; it prohibits age-based discrimination or differential
treatment throughout the entire voting process. The Amendment
does not simply say "the voting age shall be set at eighteen"; rather,
section one of the Amendment reads, "The right of citizens of the
United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of
age."" Such strong anti-discriminatory language is not unfamiliar; it is
similarly used in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 00 which
prohibit any racial or sexual discrimination that affect the right to
vote. 0 ' These amendments are understood to not only have the power
to invalidate explicitly discriminatory legislation, but also the power to
nullify facially neutral legislation enacted with a discriminatory
intent. 102 The nearly identical language of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment and the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments suggests
they should be interpreted harmoniously and that claims brought
under the amendments should be evaluated similarly.
For the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, this confirms that the
Amendment should be understood as expansive in both its scope and
power, as both the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments have been
interpreted to prohibit any type of racial or sexual discrimination at
any stage or level of the electoral process, explicit or implicit."' The
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § 1; see Michel Martin, Is Age the New Frontier of
Voting Rights ?, NPR (July 8, 2014, 12:54 PM), http://www. npr.org/2014/07/08/
329804364/is-age-the-new-frontier-of-voting-rights (promoting the idea that the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment was written as an anti-discrimination law).
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); id. amend. XIX ("The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex.").
101. See 117 CONG. REC. 7532, 7533 (1971) (statement of Rep. Celler) ("This
provision is modeled after similar provisions in the [Fifteenth A]mendment,
which outlawed racial discrimination at the polls, and the [Nineteenth
A]mendment, which enfranchised women.").
102. See generally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (affirming that
the Fifteenth Amendment can invalidate facially neutral legislation if challengers can
show the legislation was created for a discriminatory purpose).
103. See Robert J. Deichert, Rice v. Cayetano: The Fifteenth Amendment at a
Crossroads, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1075, 1080 (2000) (asserting that the plain language and
the judicial interpretations of the Fifteenth Amendment strongly demonstrate that
the Amendment acts as a bar to racial discrimination during any type of election); see
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Fifteenth Amendment in particular demands strict scrutiny where
claimants can evidence a law was enacted with a discriminatory
purpose.104 By choosing to model the Twenty-Sixth Amendment after
these amendments, its framers made clear that they were doing more
than just lowering the voting age to eighteen; they were forbidding
any legislation that frustrates voting ability based on age.
The strength of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment's plain language
becomes particularly evident when compared to other constitutional
provisions concerning age. The anti-discriminatory tone present in
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is noticeably absent from the other
age-related constitutional provisions. 105 For example, Article II of the
Constitution establishes the minimum age requirement for the
presidency, and reads, in part, "neither shall any Person be eligible to
that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five
Years."'0 6 This language, although also distinguishing the ability to
participate in the political process based on age, is markedly different
than that of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.'7 Article II does not
also Fish, supra note 15, at 1174. Some courts have even interpreted the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments to extend beyond their traditional understanding of
protecting the right of African Americans and women to vote. Fish, supra note 15, at
1175-76. See generally Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (limiting voters to
persons whose ancestry qualified them as either a "Hawaiian" or "native Hawaiian,"
as defined by statute, violated the Fifteenth Amendment because it used ancestry as a
proxy for race); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923) (recognizing
that the Nineteenth Amendment has sex-equality implications for constitutional
questions other than voting). Similarly, some applications of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment illustrate that it has a reach beyond its traditional understanding. See
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085, 1088 (1977) (holding that the
protections of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment apply to tribal secretarial elections).
104. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993) (concluding that race-based
redistricting demands strict scrutiny). Strict scrutiny requires a state or local
government to show that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(clarifying that the strict scrutiny standard ensures that the government is pursuing
an important goal and that the methods used to pursue that goal are so closely fit to
the accomplishment of the goal that there is little to no chance of ulterior motives).
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (setting minimum age requirement for the
House); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (establishing the minimum age requirement for the
Senate); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (setting the minimum age requirement for the
presidency); Fish, supra note 15, at 1171 (recognizing that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment was not written as a mere age limit disenfranchisement, such as the
Constitutional age requirements for the presidency).
106. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5
107. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No person except a natural born Citizen,
or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who
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endeavor to protect the right of those over thirty-five to run for
president. It does not read that "the right of United States citizens,
who are thirty-five years of age or older, to run for president, shall not
be denied or abridged." Rather, Article II merely sets a baseline age
that one must attain to participate in the franchise, similar to if the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment simply read, "the voting age shall be
eighteen." The fact that not all constitutional provisions concerning
age contain anti-discriminatory language further supports the idea
that the drafters of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment anticipated that it
would convey special protections to young voters.
2. The historical context and legislative history suggest he Twenty-Sixth
Amendment is an anti-discrimination amendment
The historical context of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment supports
the assertion that the Amendment should trigger strict scrutiny. The
1960s were a time of unparalleled youth activism in American history.
College attendance rates were spiking,' and the eighteen- to twenty-
one age bracket was increasingly seen as an informed and
contributing sector of society. '09 The legislature's objective in drafting
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was not to simply allow eighteen-year-
olds to vote; it sought to encourage the youth vote.' The legislature
manifested this intent not only through the Amendment's anti-
discriminatory tone, but also through its sweeping language.
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was in large part a reaction to the
Supreme Court's invalidation of Article III of the VRA, which
enfranchised eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. However, the language in
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment does not simply mirror the language
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident
within the United States."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § I ("The right of citizens of
the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of age.").
108. SeeJolicouer v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 2, 6 (Cal. 1971) ("Today more than half the
[eighteen]- to [twenty-one]-year-olds are receiving some type of higher education."
(quoting S. REP. NO. 92-26 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 931, 935)).
109. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 7532, 7533 (statement of Rep. Celler) ("Some of our
youth have disappointed us, but the preponderant majority are as sound of mind as
they are strong in body.").
110. See Worden v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 294 A.2d 233, 237 (N.J. 1972)
("The legislative history preceding the adoption of the amendment clearly evidences
the purpose not only of extending the voting right to younger voters but also of
encouraging their participation by the elimination of all unnecessary burdens and
barriers."); Jolicouer, 488 P.2d at 5 (recognizing that "channeling youthful idealism"
was a primary goal of Congress).
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used in Article III. "' While Article III only prohibited the "denial" of
the right to vote on account of age, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
contains a much more sweeping prohibition, forbidding not just the
denial of the right to vote on account of age, but also the abridgment
of the right to vote on account of age."2 The inclusion of the word
"abridged" in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is significant, as
forbidding the abridgement of the right to vote expounds a much
more expansive prohibition than merely disallowing the denial of the
right to vote. "Abridge" means to "diminish, curtail, deprive, or
reduce,""113 a range of actions and effects much broader than those
covered tunder "denial." It reflects a conscious choice by its framers
to prohibit more than just outright barriers to the right to vote; it
reveals an intent to create a comprehensive ban on any legislation
that frustrates the ability of those over eighteen to vote.1
Moreover, in discussing the reach of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,
legislators made it clear that the "right to vote" as written in the
Amendment encompasses more than the ability of one to cast a
ballot;''5 it covers any action incidental to the successful casting and
counting of one's ballot."6  Furthermore, the "right to vote" was
111. See Fish, supra note 15, at 1173 (explaining that Article III only protected young
would-be voters who were "denied the fight to vote" but the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
prevents the right of young people to vote from being denied or abridged).
112. Id. Compare Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §
302, 84 Stat. 314, 318 ("Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the
United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or in any political
subdivision in any primary or election shall be denied the right to vote in any such
primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age or
older."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of age.").
113. Jolicouer, 488 P.2d at 4.
114. See 117 CONG. REc. 7532, 7534 (statement of Rep. Poff) ("Finally the
Congress erred in confining the impact of its statute to the denial of the right to
vote, when, in fact, if the House intended to be thorough, it should have also
proscribed the abridgement of that right."); S. REP. No. 92-26, at 14 (1971) (finding
that forcing young voters to undertake special burdens such as obtaining absentee
ballots or traveling to a centralized location would dissuade them from voting); Fish,
supra note 15, at 1181 (suggesting that many policies could "abridge" the right to
vote, such as locating polling stations away from colleges, requiring registrants to
have a driver's license, or splitting a college campus between two legislative districts).
115. 117 CONG. REc. 7532, 7535 (statement of Rep. Poff) ("The 'right to vote' is a
constitutional phrase of art whose scope embraces the entire process by which the
people make their political choices.").
116. See Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (mem.) (invalidating a
Texas statute that required students to pledge an intention to stay in the community
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imagined to extend beyond voting in general and primary
elections."7 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment anticipates that anyone
eighteen years or older will not be prevented from participating in
any electoral process of any political subdivision."' Such an
expansive interpretation of the franchise further confirms that the
Amendment's authors intended to root out age-based barriers to
voting at any level of the electoral process.
3. Age should be considered a suspect class with respect to voting
Given the history of political powerlessness and discrimination
against youths with respect to voting, age should be viewed as a
suspect class in matters related to voting. In order to be considered a
suspect class, a group must generally meet four criteria: (1) "the
group in question has suffered a history of discrimination"; (2) group
members "exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
that define them as a discrete group"; (3) "the group is a minority or is
politically powerless"; and (4) "the characteristics distinguishing the
group have little relation to legitimate policy objectives or to... 'the
ability of group members to contribute to society.""'
19
Young and student voters alike have endured a history of
discrimination and political powerlessness with respect to voting.
Before the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, only three
states allowed eighteen-year-olds to vote in state and local elections.
20
Even after the passage of the Amendment, states and their political
subsidiaries continued to pass legislation that some courts recognized
as an effort to stifle the youth vote.'2' In fact, discrimination against
after graduation before students were able to register to vote).
117. 117 CONG. REc. 7532, 7540 (statement of Rep. Wiggins).
118. See id. (finding that "the act of voting" includes "the full range of rights to
participate in the election process").
119. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General
to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-
involving-defense-marriage-act.
120. As of March 1971, only Alaska, Georgia, and Kentucky allowed eighteen-year-
olds to vote. 117 CONG. REc. 7532, 7533. Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Montana
allowed those at least nineteen years old to vote, while Hawaii, Maine, and Nebraska
required that voters be at least twenty years old. Id. All other states required voters
to be at least twenty-one years old to vote. See id. (stating that only nine states allowed
those under twenty-one to vote).
121. See, e.g., Worden v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 294 A.2d 233, 245 (N.J.
1972) (finding that the county's requirement that unmarried students register to
vote in their parents' place of residence was improper discrimination and a denial of
the right to vote based on age).
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student voters persists to this day, as some legislators continue to
resent the influence young and student voters have in elections. 122
To argue that young voters have an "immutable characteristic"
would be difficult and counterintuitive; age, by its very nature, is not
immutable.123 However, proponents of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
clearly believed that young and student voters had a "distinguishable
characteristic" significant enough to warrant its own constitutional
protection. By enacting the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, legislators
sought to channel and protect "youthful idealism" in the electoral
process, a characteristic arguably possessed only by young voters.
Even if they are able to vote years later, when their status as a student
or young voter no longer frustrates their ability to vote, the "youthful
idealism" Congress once hoped to capture may be gone.
24
Furthermore, the mere existence of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
suggests that, once over the age of eighteen, an individual's age cannot
be used as a proxy for inexperience or unawareness. However, some
commentators and legislators continue to lambast youth for their
inexperience125 and suggest that their age impedes their ability to be
informed voters. In fact, some openly suggest increasing the voting age
122. See Sarah Fearon-Maradey, Note, Disenfranchising America's Youth: How
Current Voting Laws Are Contrary to the Intent of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 12 U.N.H. L.
REv. 289, 299-302 (2012) (quoting two New Hampshire legislators who accuse
students of diluting the vote in college towns and voting with ignorance and
inexperience); Bertrand M. Gutierrez, Chairman: Eliminate WSSU Early-Voting Site,
WINSTON-SALEMJoURNAL, (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.journalnow.com/news/elections/
local/article_3da9300a-07a2-1 1 e3-b6b3-001 a4bcf6878.html [hereinafter Guiterrez,
WSSUEarly-Voting Site] (explaining that the Chairman of the Forsyth County Board of
Elections proposed to shut down a college early voting site because he heard
professors were offering extra credit to students who voted).
123. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 & n.2 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(distinguishing an "immutable characteristic" as one that is determined "solely by the
accident of birth"); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61
(1978) (suggesting that an "immutable characteristic" is a trait that its possessors are
powerless to escape, such as race, age, or illegitimacy).
124. S. REP. No. 92-26 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 941 ("[P]articipation
of the young in local and State elections is particularly appropriate and necessary[]
and their point of view especially valuable in devising responsible programs.").
125. See Fearon-Maradey, supra note 122, at 302 (quoting New Hampshire
representative Gary Sorg, who claimed students vote with ignorance); Tyler
Kingkade, Things Conservative Pundits Say About Young Voters, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/03/conservative-pundits-young-
voters n 6094286.html (detailing statements made toward young voters in recent
years including Jonah Goldberg's assertion that young voters are "too frickin' stupid
to vote" and Ann Coulter's belief that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment should be
repealed and replaced with a prohibition on voting until the age of forty).
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or endorse policies making it more difficult for young voters to cast their
ballots. In maintaining this view, these commentators and legislators
suggest that age is inherently related to an individual's ability to bring
experience, knowledge, and responsibility to the voting process. The
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, with its corresponding testimony and case
law, contests the validity of such an arbitrary distinction. '26
By recognizing that young voters have a history of political
powerlessness and discrimination and that they possess certain
characteristics not assignable to other classes of voters, an argument
for treating age as a suspect class with respect to voting emerges.
Recognizing age as a suspect class in matters related to voting further
supports the contention that claims brought under the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment should receive strict scrutiny.
Taken together, the text, construction, and history of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment support its interpretation as an anti-discrimination
amendment, which prohibits a broad range of actions that may
discriminate against young or student voters. Furthermore, its textual
and historical similarities to the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments support the proposition that legislation that impinges on
Twenty-Sixth Amendment rights ought to be subject to strict scrutiny.
B. Developing a Framework for Evaluating Twenty-Sixth Amendment
Claims: Borrowing from Fifteenth Amendment Jurisprudence
Symm v. United States27 established that university and college
students have a right to vote in the state and local elections where they
attend school and that subjecting them to more stringent registration
requirements based on their status as students violates their Twenty-
Sixth Amendment rights. ' It is, therefore, clear that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment prohibits legislation or action that makes explicit age-
based distinctions with respect to voting.'29 However, no court has
126. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REc. 7532, 7558 (1971) (statement of Rep. Adams) ('There can
be little question that [eighteenI-year-olds today are better informed and more openly
committed to a compassionate and just future for our country than at any previous time.").
127. 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (mem.).
128. See generally id. (discussing the different methods states had used to impose
restrictions on student voting, such as presumptions of non-residence and
demanding questionnaires); see also Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05
(M.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that requiring a higher standard of proof for students
seeking to establish domicile violated the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
129. Although some argue that discrimination based on student status does not
equate to discrimination based on age because students may be of any age, courts
regularly allow Twenty-Sixth Amendment claims based on impediments to student
voting, reasoning that a majority of students are between eighteen and twenty years old.
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thoroughly evaluated when facially neutral legislation may violate the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment.130  Given the similarities between the
construction of the Fifteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, Fifteenth
Amendmentjurispnidence should serve as a guide in bringing Twenty-
Sixth Amendment claims against facially neutral legislation.
By combining several Supreme Court and lower court decisions, a
framework for evaluating facially neutral legislation under the
Fifteenth Amendment materializes. Where legislation or an official
state action is facially neutral, a plaintiff alleging a violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment must be able to show discriminatory purpose,
not simply a disproportionate impact.13  However, a plaintiff may
evince a discriminatory purpose by illustrating that the challenged
legislation disproportionately affects a certain race.132 Moreover, a
discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, both direct and circumstantial.3  In this respect, a
plaintiff may use historical background or a specific series of events
leading up to the decision,' the legislative or administrative history
See, e.g., Walgren v. Bd. of Selectmen, 519 F.2d 1364, 1368 (1st Cir. 1975) (allowing a
class suit on behalf of the entire college community to be brought under the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment); United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp. 1245, 1247-49, 1261 (S.D.
Tex. 1978) (concluding that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment protects the right of
students to vote in their college communities). But see Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp.
527, 531-32 (E.D. Ky. 1971) (reasoning that student voting rights voting cases are
distinguishable from minority voting rights cases, and student voting rights cases
should be brought under the Fourteenth, rather than the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
130. See Walgren, 519 F.2d at 1367 (upholding facially neutral legislation
challenged under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment because county officials made a
good faith effort to work with the students to find an acceptable alternative).
131. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287-88 (M.D. Ala.
2013) (ruling that although Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act lessens the burden of
proof for plaintiffs, the Fifteenth Amendment still requires a discriminatory purpose).
132. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70 (stating that disproportionate impact may be used
as a starting point); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
(determining that evidence that the impact of an official action bears more heavily
on one race than another is a good starting point for plaintiffs attempting to show an
invidious discriminatory purpose).
133. See generally Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977).
134. See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221-25, 231-32 (1964) (using a
series of decisions by the Virginia General Assembly, such as closing public schools,
opening racially segregated private schools, and using public funds to maintain those
private schools, as evidence of an invidious discriminatory intent); Schnell v. Davis,
336 U.S. 933 (1949) (mem.) (noting the fact that the original section of the state
constitution detailing voting qualifications had stood for fifty years, and the new
amendment came on the heels of a Supreme Court decision that affirmed that voters
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behind the action,:' any departure from normal procedures or
substantive criteria,13 6 or any other information a court may find
relevant. A plaintiff may also demonstrate that the challenged
legislation or purpose has no practical purpose except to
disenfranchise a certain sector of the population. 13' A plaintiff need
not show that the challenged action was motivated solely or primarily
by racial considerations;18 the plaintiff need only show that race was
one of the motivating factors in the action or legislation.131 If a
plaintiff can demonstrate that the challenged legislation, although
neutral on its face, was enacted with some racially discriminatory
intent, it will be subject o strict scrutiny. "0 Under such scrutiny, a law
enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose will be invalidated unless
it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. "'
Such a framework can be easily applied to Twenty-Sixth Amendment
cases. Thus, where legislation is neutral on its face, a plaintiff alleging
a violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment must demonstrate that the
legislation was enacted with a discriminatory intent-to discourage or
frustrate voting among students or young voters. The plaintiff may
show a disproportionate impact and use the totality of relevant facts
surrounding the legislation to evidence a discriminatory intent. Where
of all races must be given equal opportunity to vote in state primaries).
135. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 (asserting that "[t]he legislative and
administrative history of the decision may be highly relevant, especially" if there are
statements by those involved with the legislation); see Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp.
872, 876, 880 (S.D. Ala. 1949) affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (finding relevant the
published testimony of a distinguished Alabama lawyer who had stated that the
proposed amendment to the state constitution had the purpose of giving registrars
arbitrary power to exclude African Americans from voting).
136. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
137. See id. at 266; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (ruling that the
redistricting legislation at issue was so bizarre that it was "unexplainable on grounds
other than race"); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 359 (1915) (concluding that
a grandfather clause that had the practical effect of enfranchising only white voters
had no discernible purpose other than to disenfranchise black voters).
138. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255-56.
139. See Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing
that "[r]acial discrimination need only be one purpose ... of an official act in order for a
violation of the ... Fifteenth Amendment[] to occur"). But see Levy v. Scranton, 780 F.
Supp. 897, 901 (N.D.N.Y 1991) (finding that while the subjective intent of some of the
legislators impermissibly targeted student voters, this did not automatically mean the
subjective intent was a motivating factor on the part of the entire legislature).
140. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903-04 (1995) (explaining the legislature's
action will be subjected to strict scrutiny where race is the overriding factor).
141. Id. at 904.
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legislation has been shown to burden a plaintiffs Twenty-Sixth
Amendment right, courts ought to apply strict scrutiny.
C. Taken Together, VIVA's Strict ID Requirements, Elimination of Same-Day
Voting, Prohibition on Out-of-Precinct Voting and Termination of Sixteen and
Seventeen-Year-Old Registration, Violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
Because VIVA is a facially neutral piece of legislation,4 ' in order to
prevail on their Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim, the students must
demonstrate that the challenged provisions of VIVA were motivated
by a discriminatory purpose.4' Although this may seem a daunting
task, students may use the totality of the relevant facts, including, if it
is true, that the law bears more heavily on young voters, to evidence a
discriminatory purpose.4" Inferring a discriminatory purpose will
necessarily require a sensitive inquiry into the facts surrounding the
legislation, both circumstantial and direct.'45  Additionally, the
students may include relevant background or legislative history. 14 6
1. Demonstrating that VIVA will disproportionately affect student and young voters
Currently, students may have difficulty demonstrating discriminatory
intent through a disproportionate impact, as VIVA's most damning
element for students, its strict identification provision, has yet to take
effect.147  However, there is much to suggest that strict voter
identification requirements will likely have a disproportionate effect on
student voters. Foremost, students have a recognized difficulty in
obtaining identification that complies with such strict standards.' 48 In
142. See generatly 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 (making no reference to age or
status as a college student).
143. Cf Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion) (finding
that, in order to violate the Fifteenth Amendment, facially neutral legislation must be
shown to have been enacted with a discriminatory purpose).
144. Cf id. at 70 ("[T]he impact of the official action-whether it bears more
heavily on one race than another-may" be used as evidence of an intentional
discriminatory purpose); Taylor v. Haywood Cnty., 544 F. Supp. 1122, 1133 (W.D.
Tenn. 1982) ("Necessarily, however, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of relevant facts.").
145. Cf Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977) (allowing challengers to present circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory
purpose, such as a departure from normal legislative procedure).
146. Cf id. at 267 (announcing that those claiming a Fourteenth Amendment
violation may use relevant legislative history or background surrounding the
legislation or action to show a discriminatory purpose).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-166.13 (effective Jan. 1, 2016) (clarifying that the
identification requirements will not be enforced until 2016).
148. See Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at
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fact, this difficulty has led some states to allow students to use their
university or college-issued IDs as a form of identification for voting
purposes."19 Under VIVA, students cannot use their student ID as
identification for voting purposes. Even under VIVA's new "relaxed"
identification provision, which should allow voters without an
acceptable form of photo identification to cast a ballot if they can
identify a "reasonable impediment," it is unclear whether students will
be able to vote without a state or federally-issued ID.
VIVA's restrictions on the use of out-of-state licenses may also
disproportionately affect students. Despite the fact that many
students come to North Carolina from out-of-state to attend school, 'I
50
VIVA only allows voters to use out-of-state licenses as photo
identification if they have registered to vote in North Carolina within
ninety days of the election.151 However, VIVA also mandates that
registration books close twenty-five days prior to the election.152 This
leaves would-be voters carrying out-of-state licenses only a fixed sixty-
five day period to register to vote. This resembles the voting
handicap the Supreme Court found violative of the Fifteenth
Amendment in Lane v. Wilson.153 Similar to VIVA, the legislation at
issue in that case was facially neutral; however, it had the practical
effect of allowing black citizens only twelve days to register to vote. 
154
Despite its neutrality, the Supreme Court still found the statute
unconstitutional because the statute's practical effect operated against
the very class the Fifteenth Amendment sought to protect.
155 It will
*5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (recognizing that the Pennsylvania Legislature
allows student IDs as a form of identification for voting purposes due to the
difficulties students would otherwise have in obtaining complaint identification); see
also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-634, ELECrIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO
STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAws 52-54 (2014) (reporting that changes in voter
identification laws in Kansas and Tennessee disproportionately affect those in the
eighteen to twenty-three age range).
149. Applewhite, 2014 WL 184988, at *5.
150. Amended Complaint at 9-10, N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory,
997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13 CV 00660).
151. N.C.GENSTAT. § 163-166.13.
152. Id.
153. Cf 307 U.S. 268, 271 (1939) (involving an Oklahoma statute that
automatically qualified voters that had voted in the 1914 general election, but
required all other voters to register within a twelve-day period or risk losing their
right to the franchise permanently).
154. See id. at 269-72 (explaining that the 1914 general election had been based on a
"grandfather clause" that exempted many white voters from the required literacy test and
the 1916 statute then grandfathered those citizens' voting qualifications).
155. See id. at 269-77.
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likely be difficult for students, with inflexible class schedules and
questionable access to transportation, to comply with VIVA's requirement
that they register to vote during a specific sixty-five day period. 1
56
The prohibition on out-of-precinct and same-day voting may have a
disproportionate effect on students as well. With the elimination of out-
of-precinct voting, voters are required to vote within their proper
precinct, which is determined by the address where the voter has lived
thirty or more days prior to the election. 157 For new college students,
this is likely their parents' residence, unless the students officially
changed their place of residence shortly after their move. This is
comparable to the practice of presuming college students are
domiciliaries of their parents' residence, a practice that courts have
nearly uniformly condemned. 15' Furthermore, students often change
residences throughout their college career,159 a quality that courts have
found relevant in determining whether the elimination of certain voting
procedures disproportionately affects particular classes of voters. "
Despite the fact that the identification provision, which will
arguably affect student voters the most, will likely not yet be in effect
when this case goes to full trial, students challenging this legislation
should still be able to use Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment case
law to make a colorable argument that these provisions will
disproportionately affect them as a class. However, given the recent
156. The students contesting VIVA may have a difficult time making their case
because, by the time the trial takes place, the provision of VIVA outlining the
identification requirements will still not have gone into effect. See N.C. GEN STAT. §
163-166.13. However, the students should still be able to draw a strong comparison
to the fixed registration periods that were found to operate unfairly against black
citizens in Lane v. Wilson.
157. Voting in North Carolina, N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, http://www.ncsbe.gov/
ncsbe/Voting (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
158. See, e.g., Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1971) (holding that
the presumption that students are domiciliaries of their parents' residence
violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
159. See Hanneet Kauer, College Students Challenge North Carolina Voting Law, USA TODAY
(July 16, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://college.usatoday.com/2014/07/16/college-students-
challenge-north-carolina-voting-law-2 (interviewing an Appalachian State University senior
who states that she has moved four times during her college experience).
160. See id. (reasoning that measures such as out-of-precinct voting and same-day
registration can complicate the voting process for students who move to different
counties to attend college); cf. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d
224, 233 (4th Cir. 2014) (issuing a preliminary injunction against the prohibition on
out-of-precinct voting, based in part on the finding that 17.1 percent of African
Americans moved within the state between 2006 and 2010, compared with only 10.9
percent of whites), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
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relaxation of the identification provision, although unclear in its
application to students, the students will have to overcome the
argument that the relaxation represents an effort by the legislature to
come to a mutually acceptable arrangement. 16'
2. Evidencing a discnminay intent from the relevant background of the legislation
The students will have an easier time demonstrating discriminatory
intent from the relevant background and legislative history of the
legislation. First and foremost, the students should point out that the
impact of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment on communities and states
with large student populations has been a concern ever since the
Amendment's drafting. 162 In fact, prejudices against student voters are
just as strong today as they were during the Amendment's enactment.
163
For example, in 2012, New Hampshire representative Gary Sorg
remarked that "average taxpayers in college towns... are having their
votes diluted" by student voters who vote with "ignorance and
inexperience."164 The New Hampshire House Speaker similarly blamed
college students for impeding the ability of college towns to govern
themselves.165 In 2011, Maine's Secretary of State, Charles Summers,
sent threatening emails to university students, encouraging them to
reregister outside their college towns.166 Since VIVA's enactment, there
has been at least one recognized official act of discrimination against
student voters: the closure of the early voting site at Appalachian State
University.'67 The students should argue that, similar to southern states
with a history of racial discrimination, states that have traditionally been
home to large student populations and which have demonstrated
161. Walgren v. Bd. of Selectmen, 519 F.2d 1364, 1368 (1st Cir. 1975) (concluding
that the county officials made a good faith effort to find a mutually acceptable election
date and, therefore, the election date was not intended to discriminate against students).
162. See 117 CONG. REc. 7532, 7538 (statement of Rep. Michel) ("My principal
concern with this particular measure is one that has to do with permitting [eighteen]-
year-olds to vote, for instance, in local and municipal elections in college towns.").
163. See Fearon-Maradey, supra note 122, at 301-02 (quoting representatives who
explicitly seek to curb college student voting because they believe student voters
dilute the votes of other community residents).
164. Id. at 302.
165. Id. at 301.
166. See id. at 299 (noting that it is not believed that Summers sent such an email
to any other class of voters).
167. Anderson v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 387P14, 2014 WL 6771270, at *2
(N.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 2014) (finding no other purpose behind the decision to move
the voting site off-campus other than an attempt to discourage student voters).
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instances of hostility toward student voters should be subject to closer
scrutiny for Twenty-Sixth Amendment purposes. 8
VIVA's legislative history and the sequence of events leading up to
VIVA's enactment evidence a discriminatory intent. "a VIVA's strict
provisions came on the heels of a controversial Supreme Court
decision, a quality that courts have previously found indicative of
discriminatory intent when applied to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments."70 In fact, the original legislation, which merely sought
to require some form of photo identification for in-person voting, was
set aside for three months'7' and saw rapid action only after the
Supreme Court issued the Shelby County decision.'72 What began as a
relatively short document transformed into a fifty-seven page
behemoth that among other things, denied the use of student IDs,
placed strict requirements on the use of out-of-state licenses, ended
same-day registration, prohibited out-of-precinct voting, and
eliminated teenage preregistration.' The opportunistic timing of
this draconian legislation suggests that its drafters did not believe
such legislation would have passed the scrutiny of the Department of
168. Cf Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 268-71 (1939) (recognizing Oklahoma's history
of racial discrimination and citing it as a reason to infer discriminatory intent); Taylor v.
Haywood Cnty., 544 F. Supp. 1122, 1130, 1133 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding a history of
racial discrimination relevant in an alleged Fifteenth Amendment violation).
169. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977) (establishing that the sequence of events leading up to legislation may often
be relevant in determining whether there was discriminatory intent).
170. See Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (mem.) (recognizing that the new
amendment, which mandated prospective voters be able to understand and explain any
section of the United States Constitution, came on the heels of a Supreme Court decision
affirning that voters of all races must be given equal opportunity to vote in state
primaries); see also Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964) (observing that
shortly after Brozn v. Board of Education, which found school segregation unconstitutional,
Prince Edward County's school board began to shut down all public schools, effectively
forcing students to go to racially segregated private schools); Sloane v. Smith, 351 F.
Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (tracing the origin of a county's change in voting
procedure to the VRA, which enfranchised eighteen-year-olds). Relatedly, in Arlington
Heights, the Supreme Court reasoned that it would be suspicious if a tract of property had
been zoned as multi-family, but was suddenly re-zoned as single-family when officials
learned of a plan to erect multi-family housing. 429 U.S. at 267.
171. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 231, 242 (4th Cir.
2014) (noting that after Shelby County, North Carolina "rushed" to pass VIVA "literally
the next day"), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).
172. See id. at 242-43 (reasoning that at this time the North Carolina Senate
believed they would have to submit the legislation to the United States Department
of Justice for clearance, but the Senate also knew that the Supreme Court was
considering a challenge to the enforceability of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
173. See generally 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381.
1534 [Vol. 64:1503
THE YOUNG AND THE RESTLESS
Justice, likely because the drafters recognized that aspects of the
legislation would have been considered iscriminatory."'
The political climate in North Carolina surrounding the enactment of
VIVA suggests discriminatory intent.'75 North Carolina is home to
hundreds of thousands of college and university students,'76 and the size
and influence of this class of voters is relevant in determining the
motivations behind official action or legislation.'77 Student voters played
an enormous role in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections;
commentators believe these voters were responsible for transforming
North Carolina into a blue state for the first time in over a generation in
2008.178 Although Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney took
the state in 2012, he won by only a narrow margin,'79' and two-thirds of
voters under thirty-years-old still voted for President Barack Obama. '
Commentators assert that student voters were responsible for keeping the
election close.'' The fact that Republican legislators passed such austere
legislation following a period of such intense student influence suggests
they were trying to "fenc [e] out" students based on the way they vote. '
174. Cf Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 876, 880 (S.D. Ala. 1949) affd, 336 U.S.
933 (1949) (concluding that a review of the circumstances and history surrounding
the enactment of the amendment illustrate that its purpose was to frustrate the
ability of African-American would-be voters to cast their ballots).
175. Cf Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 637-38 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding relevant
testimony that, at the time Texas was enacting its voting law, the state was undergoing a
demographic shift that suggested Republicans would face a declining voter base).
176. Amended Complaint at 7, N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F.
Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 1:13 CV 00660); see also About Our System, U. OF N.C.,
http://www.northcarolina.edu/?q=content/about-our-system (last visited Aug. 9, 2015)
(highlighting the more than 220,000 students enrolled at sixteen state system campuses).
177. See Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D. Pa. 1972) ("The fact that
Pennsylvania State University, with a student population of 27,200, is located within Centre
County, with a total population, including the students, of 99,450 cannot be overlooked.").
178. Apuzzo, supra note 32 (reporting that, in 2008, students voted
"overwhelmingly" for Barack Obama, while he lost every other age group).
179. Stephanie Strom, Election 2012: North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/results/states/north-carolina (illustrating
that, in North Carolina, Romney received 50.6 percent of the votes, while Obama
received 48.4 percent of the votes).
180. Kingkade & Knafo, supra note 10.
181. Apuzzo, supra note 32 (noting that student voter turnout was fifty-seven
percent, among the highest urnout rates in the country).
182. See generally Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-95 (1965) (holding that
legislators may not fence out a sector of the population based on the way that group
of individuals generally votes).
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Legislator statements surrounding VIVA's enactment also indicate
a discriminatory purpose.83 Just one day after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Shelby County, which allowed North
Carolina to pass electoral legislation without federal preclearance,
one senator remarked, "So, now we can go with the full bill." 1' Such
a statement illustrates that legislators already had an alternate version
of the bill that responded not to changing electoral conditions, but
rather to a Supreme Court decision.85  During the committee
meeting concerning the legislation, Jamie Phillips, counsel for the
NAACP, spoke before the North Carolina Senate Rules Committee:
"The fewer young people and minorities who vote, the better it seems in
your minds. We get it. No one is being fooled."'8" Phillips's
confrontation with the Rules Committee echoes a situation the Supreme
Court found relevant in Schnell v. Davis,' where members of the legal
community suggested that the purpose of a proposed state amendment
was discriminatory.188 Furthermore, during VIVA's debate, opponents
openly characterized the measure as disproportionately affecting African
Americans, young voters, and the elderly. 18')
The elimination of teenage preregistration9 ' and the mandated
high school voter registration drive"" further demonstrate that
183. Cf Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hotis. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-
68 (1977) (stating that aspects of the legislative history, especially statements by
members of decision-making bodies, may be highly relevant in determining the
existence of discriminatory intent).
184. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322,
336 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
185. But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (reasoning that the
statements of only a few legislators may be irrelevant because what motivates one legislator
to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates others to enact it).
186. McCrary, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
187. 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (mem.).
188. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 876, 880 (S.D. Ala. 1949) affid, 336 U.S. 933 (1949)
(affirming the Alabama District Court's decision, which suggested that published statements
from the legal community alleging that the purpose of the Boswell Amendment was to
disenfranchise African Americans contributed to the claim that the Legislature had a
general understanding that this would be the effect of the amendment).
189. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 337; see also Marcia Mercer, Can We Still Vote?,
AARP (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/
info-01-2012/voter-id-laws-impact-older-americans.html (explaining that one in five
senior citizens lacks a current government-issued photo ID, and many senior citizens
lack the proper documentation to be issued a new ID).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.23 (2014) (eliminating the word "preregister" from the
former provision); see also Anne Blythe, Elimination of NC Voter Preregistration Program Creates
Confusion for DMV and Elections Officials, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER (Jul. 2, 2014),
http://www.chalotteobserver.com/2014/07/02/5020938/eliminatio-of-nc-voter-
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VIVA's proponents sought to discourage young voters from
participating in the electoral process. While sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds have no constitutionally protected right to vote,192 the
legislature's decision to end this program, which has seemingly no
relation to the issue of voter fraud,' bolsters the argument that the
legislature was trying to discourage political participation of young
voters by making it less convenient for young voters to register.
VIVA's prohibition on the use of university- and college-issued
student IDs for voting194 further demonstrates a discriminatory intent.
Student IDs are the one form of photo identification every young
voter is likely to possess. In September 2014, the Government
Accountability Office released a study stating that, of the twenty states
that require photo identification for in-person voting, twelve states
accept student IDs for photo identification. ' 5 The willingness of
other states to accept student IDs as voter identification suggests that
the prohibition of student IDs is not significantly related to the
prevention of voter fraud and is merely being used to impede student
voting. 196 In allowing student IDs to be used as voter identification,
the Pennsylvania legislature recognized that students would otherwise
face difficulties obtaining a compliant form of identification.
9 7
Strengthening this notion is the fact that North Carolina is willing to
make considerations for other groups; it allows service members to
use their military IDs and permits individuals over seventy-years-old to
use an expired license.98 This situation can be analogized to the
preregistration.html#.VDbcY_14rwg (acknowledging that, since the preregistration was
enacted in 2010, over 50,000 sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds have preregistered every year).
191. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538.
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (enfranchising only those eighteen years and over).
193. Cf Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993) (noting that the North
Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme "so irrational on its
face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters" based on their
race); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
(reasoning that departures from substantive criteria related to the goals of the
legislation may be taken into consideration).
194. N.C. GEN STAT. § 163-166.13.
195. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED
TO STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAws 18 (Sept. 2014).
196. Cf Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 688-89 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(per curiam) (arguing that, because many states can close their registration books
only thirty days before the election, Georgia's need to close its registration books fifty
days before the election seemed less compelling).
197. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 MD. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *3
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014).
198. N.C. GEN STAT. § 163-166.13.
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situation confronted in United States v. Bibb County Democratic Executive
Committee, 19 where polling stations separated by race were found to
violate the Fifteenth Amendment because, even though the right to
vote remained intact, distinctions based on race discouraged
participation.0 By allowing some groups, but not others, to use
special identification for voting purposes, VIVA draws distinctions
based on group membership that may discourage participation.
Furthermore, the combination of the prohibition on student IDs
and the restriction on out-of-state licenses effectively require students
to pledge to stay in the community after graduation, a tactic the
Supreme Court found violative of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in
Symm v. United States.20 1 By preventing students from using their
university-issued identification for voting purposes, the state confines
most students to a driver's license as a source of identification. As
previously mentioned, however, an individual may only use an out-of-
state driver's license as identification for in-person voting if they have
registered to vote within ninety days of the election. Therefore, in
order to vote in the community where they attend school, an out-of-
state student attending a college or university in North Carolina
generally must obtain a North Carolina driver's license. In Symm, the
Court agreed with the lower court's finding that laws requiring
students to manifest an intent to stay in the community where they
attend school in order to register to vote violated the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment.0 2 Students in North Carolina can analogize VIVA's
provisions to this holding, arguing that VIVA's provisions effectively
require students to pledge to stay in the community where they
attend school in order to vote there.
The closing of college polling stations during VIVA's enactment
further indicates that officials sought to suppress the voices of young
voters.2 1 3 Since VIVA's enactment in 2013, county boards of election
199. 222 F. Supp. 493, 499 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
200. See id. at 494-95, 499 (illustrating that requiring citizens to vote only at
specific polling stations based on racial distinctions impaired the overall ability of
Bibb County citizens of all races to vote because African Americans could show up to
vote and be turned away based on the color of their skin).
201. 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (mem.).
202. Id.; see also Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (M.D. Pa. 1972)
(concluding that because a policy that operated to require college students to show a
Pennsylvania driver's license in order to register to vote was adopted out of fear of
student influence in elections, it violated the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
203. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-88 (1971) (announcing that the
location of polling places has an obvious potential for denying or abridging the right
to vote); see also S. REP. No. 92-26, at 14 (1971) (stating that forcing young voters to
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have shut down early voting sites on several college campuses across
the state.2"4 Local election officials argue that some of these closures
were mandated by pre-existing law that required all polling locations
have curbside voting for disabled voters.2" 5 Chairman of the Forsyth
County Board of Elections closed the early-voting station at the
historically black Winston-Salem State University upon discovering
that professors were offering their students credit if they voted.20 6
Similarly, the Watauga County Board of Elections eliminated the
polling station historically located on Appalachian State University's
campus, citing voter confusion as their justification.2 7  The Board
relocated the polling station to a county building located off a busy
road with no sidewalks,208 over a mile from campus.2z9  There is no
public transportation.21 °  Students filed a lawsuit in Wake County
Superior Court challenging the closure. The judge agreed that the
primary intent of the board's decision was to discourage young
voters.211 Closing college polling stations and relocating the stations
in relatively inaccessible areas may provide evidence that elected
officials are unresponsive to the needs of students or are trying to
undertake burdens uch as traveling to a centralized location would dissuade them
from voting, in contravention of the VRA and equal protection under the law
afforded to young voters by the Fourteenth Amendment); Fish, supra note 15, at
1181 (suggesting that the closing of college polling stations could be seen as a policy
that "abridge [s]" the right to vote based on age).
204. Evan Walker-Willis, Blocking the Youth Vote in the South, INST. FOR S. STUDIES (Oct.
29, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2014/10/blocking-the-youth-
vote-in-the-south.html (reporting that North Carolina State University, Duke University,
Winston-Salem State University, East Carolina University, Appalachian State University,
and University of North Carolina at Charlotte all experienced poll closures).
205. Id.
206. Gutierrez, WSSUEarly-Voting Site, supra note 122 (stating that the Chairman
thought such voting was illegal and led to "irregularities").
207. Bertrand M. Gutierrez, Access to Boone Voting Site Raised as Major Concern,
WINSTON-SALEMJOURNAL, (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.journalnow.com/
news/state_region/article_9a0bc822-07a6-11e3-ab6f-001a4bcf6878.html [hereinafter
Gutierrez, Access to Boone Voting Site].
208. Id.
209. Walking Directions from Plemmons Student Union to the Watauga Cnty. Agric.
Conference Ctr., Google Maps, https://www.google.com/maps (follow "Get Directions"
hyperlink; then search "A" for "Plemmons Student Union" and search "B" for "Watauga
County Agricultural Conference Center"; then follow "Get Directions" hyperlink).
210. Gutierrez, Access to Boone Voting Site, supra note 207. One ASU student
commented that she believed the new location would discourage many would-be
student voters. See id. (stating that the student knew a lot of people who said they had
no way of getting to the new polling station and did not want to walk along the road).
211. Andersonv. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 14-CVS-12648, 2014 WL 6771270, at *1
(N.C. Sup. Ct. Oct 13,2014) (denying summaryjudgment for county board of elections).
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dissuade students from voting, situations courts often find relevant in
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment inquiries.
12
Borrowing from Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, students challenging facially neutral legislation under
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment must show the legislation was enacted
with a discriminatory intent and may demonstrate the discriminatory
intent using all relevant information surrounding the law's
enactment. In pursuit of this goal, the students in North Carolina
may evidence the probable disproportionate effects of VIVA's fixed
registration periods for out-of-state licenses and the prohibition of
the use of student IDs. The students can also reference VIVA's
accelerated journey through the legislature as well as legislator
statements surrounding its enactment to evidence a discriminatory
purpose. Similarly, the closure of college campus voting stations and
the termination of teenage preregistration indicate that legislators
and officials intended to curb the youth vote. Where young or
student voters can use facts such as these to demonstrate that
legislation was created with discriminatory intent, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment should trigger strict scrutiny.
D. VIVA Would Fail Strict Scrutiny
In order to survive strict scrutiny, a state must show it has a
compelling interest in regulating the material and the legislation is
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest.21 3 Under such a
formulation, the burden is on the state to show that its interest is not
only compelling, but cannot be served by less restrictive means.214
North Carolina, like many states that have enacted stricter voting
regulations, asserts that the purpose of its new voting legislation is to
combat voter fraud. The Supreme Court has recognized and
defended curbing voter fraud as a compelling state interest.21 5 Those
212. Cf Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 613, 625-26 (1982) (finding the
unresponsiveness and insensitivity of local officials to the needs of black communities
relevant to the discriminatory intent inquiry). While a finding that local officials
have been "unresponsive" to the needs of a particular class generally involves an
inquiry into past abuses, the Supreme Court has noted that contemporaneous acts of
discrimination have more probative value. See id. at 613; see also McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 298 n.20 (1987).
213. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (reasoning that
strict scrutiny requires an important governmental goal and that the methods used to
reach such goal be a close fit).
214. See id. (concluding that the fit must be so close that there is little to no doubt
the legislation is serving no other purpose).
215. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191, 196 (2008)
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seeking to challenge VIVA or similar legislation on Twenty-Sixth
Amendment grounds would have a difficult, if not impossible, time
arguing that combating voter fraud is not a compelling state interest.
This would likely be true even in states such as North Carolina where
instances of voter fraud are low.21  However, many voter
identification laws, including VIVA, have measures that are so
excessive in comparison to the relatively low risk of in-person voter
fraud217 that it suggests reducing voter fraud is not the legislation's
only purpose. Legislation that has restrictions so out of proportion
with the state interest cannot be said to be "narrowly tailored."
Proponents of VIVA and similar legislation could defend the
prohibition on student IDs by arguing that, unlike other forms of
accepted identification, student IDs are not government-issued.
Supporters of VIVA could assert that the law's willingness to accept
expired licenses and military licenses but not student IDs is not based
in student discrimination, but is rather based on an effort to ensure
that everyone who votes has a government issued form of
identification. Even proponents of Texas's voting laws, which allow
gun owners to use their concealed carry permits as identification for
in-person voting, but do not allow students to use their student IDs,218
could maintain that because a government-issued ID is required to
obtain a concealed carry permit,219 such permit demonstrates that the
carrier possesses a proper government-issued ID. However, it is
unclear how disallowing student IDs, which often bear a photo of the
student, the student's name, an expiration date, and the name of an
educational institution within the state, has any relation to combating
(finding that there is "no question" of the "legitimacy" and "propriety" of a state's
interest in using a variety of methods to prevent voter fraud).
216. See Widespread Voter Fraud Not an Issue in NC, Data Shows, supra note 73
(stating that, in the 2012 elections, voter fraud allegations accounted for only
0.00174 percent of ballots cast).
217. See Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 6
(2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%
20About%20Voter%2OFraud.pdf (finding that the type of voter fraud targeted by
photo identification laws is more rare than death by lightning strike). Judge Posner
recently rejected voter fraud justifications for the strict voter identification laws in
Wisconsin, citing the low incidence of voter fraud in Wisconsin. See Frank v. Walker,
773 F.3d 783, 788, 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner,J., dissenting) (alleging that the
Wisconsin legislature had created a solution to resolve a non-existent voter fraud
problem by quipping, "If the Wisconsin legislature says witches are a problem, shall
Wisconsin courts be permitted to conduct witch trials?").
218. Rosenthal, supra note 9.
219. TEx. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFELY REGULATORYSERVS. Div., Concealed Handgun Licensing,
https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/internetforms/Forms/CHL-6.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2015).
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in-person voter fraud.220 Moreover, as previously mentioned, given
the fact that many other states allow student IDs to be used as
identification for in-person voting, it is less convincing that these
forms of identification pose a serious threat of being used to
perpetuate voter fraud.221 Supporters of VIVA have not shown that
eliminating an entire class of identification is the least restrictive way
to lessen the threat of in-person voter fraud.
VIVA's proponents have similarly failed to show that the provision
eliminating North Carolina's preregistration for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds i narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling
interest of combating voter fraud.2 22  As previously mentioned,
individuals under eighteen-years-old do not have a constitutional
right to vote. However, it is unclear how doing away with a program
that simply added teenagers' names to the voter rolls once they turn
eighteen is related to the state's asserted goal of reducing in-person
voter fraud. In fact, some suggest that the new legislation
complicates the process of registering eighteen-year-old voters.
Complicating the process could arguably lead to an increase in
improper names being added to the voter lists-quite the opposite of
the state's asserted interest and clearly not narrowly tailored.
In demonstrating the need for the restrictions on out-of-state
licenses, supporters of VIVA could argue that states have an interest
in ensuring that voters are "bona fide residents" of the state and
that requiring all would-be voters to bear an in-state license is an
effective method in achieving this end. However, the state has not
shown this is the least restrictive method for demonstrating a voter
is a bona-fide resident, especially when considering the unique
220. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977) (reasoning that departures from substantive criteria related to the goals of
the legislation may be taken into consideration). But see Reply in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 13, Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex.
2014) (Nos. 2:13-CV-193, 2:13-CV-263, 2:13-CV-291) (arguing that, unlike the other
forms of identification accepted by Texas's voter identification law, student IDs do
not demonstrate that the holder is a resident of Texas).
221. Because so many other states accept student IDs and out-of-state licenses as
identification for in-person voting, it is less clear that this restriction is rationally related
to the state goal of reducing voter fraud. Cf Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 688-89
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (arguing that because many states can
close their registration books only thirty days before the election, Georgia's need to
close its registration books fifty days before the election seemed less compelling).
222. Cf Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (noting that the
defendants did not demonstrate that the discriminatory features of Texas's voting
law were necessary to prevent fraud).
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position of students; the Supreme Court has held that officials
cannot require students to pledge an intent to stay in the
community where they attend school in order to register to vote.2 3
Despite the relatively low threat of in-person voter fraud, arguing
that reducing voter fraud is not a compelling state interest may be a
losing argument. Although the burden is still on the state to show
that preventing voter fraud is a compelling state interest, it is likely an
assertion that most courts will accept. In contrast, states that have
enacted restrictive voting legislation may have a more difficult time
illustrating such laws are narrowly tailored to achieve this goal.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment should trigger strict scrutiny when
facially neutral legislation is enacted with the purpose of frustrating
young or student voting. Courts reviewing Twenty-Sixth Amendment
claims should treat student and young voters as a suspect class with
respect to voting, given the history of purposeful exclusion of young
individuals from the franchise until the 1970s and given the
continued suspicion of young voters.2 4 A court should evaluate a
Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim against facially-neutral legislation as
it would for Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims, by
requiring the presence of a discriminatory purpose225 and allowing
plaintiffs to demonstrate such discriminatory purpose from the
totality of relevant facts, including disproportionate impact.226 Courts
should pay special attention where, as is the case in North Carolina, a
state seeks to restrict the use of student IDs and out-of-state licenses
for voting purposes, as these two forms of identification are so heavily
relied upon by students.227 In particular, courts should recognize
that a prohibition on student IDs is not narrowly tailored to the
prevention of fraud and likely indicates that such legislation was
enacted under an ulterior motive. This is especially salient where the
legislation makes exceptions for other types of identification, such as
military IDs and handgun licenses.
223. Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (mem.).
224. See supra Part II.A.3. (providing a history of youth voter issues).
225. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the background and history of discriminatory purpose).
226. See supra Part II.B. (outlining the connection between demonstrating
discriminatory purpose with scrutiny of laws involving racial impacts and VIVA's use of age).
227. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent difficulty
for a student to obtain proper identification and providing the example of the
Pennsylvania legislature allowing student identification due to this hardship).
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The group of students alleging that VIVA violates the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment ought to bring the claim as a class action rather than as
individual plaintiffs, as all other cases brought under the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment have done.22 As it is unlikely that any of the
students will have been denied the right to vote when this case goes
to trial, it will be difficult to successfully assert an individual interest.
The students can argue VIVA's legislative history, statements from
legislators and the legal community concerning the legislation, VIVA's
elimination of teenage preregistration and student IDs, and the closing
of some college polling stations indicate that one of the purposes in
enacting VIVA was to curb the influence of young voters in North
Carolina.229 Moreover, the students can argue that although the strict
identification requirements have yet to take effect, such requirements
could have a disproportionate impact on young and student voters.230
The students should concede that preventing voter fraud is a
legitimate state interest, but note that VIVA's measures are so out of
proportion with the actual threat of voter fraud that the legislation is
not narrowly tailored to the state's goal of combating voter fraud.
When considering the case, the court should endorse a broad
reading of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Such a reading will not
only be consistent with the Amendment's history and plain text,
but it will also demonstrate a continued commitment to the
purpose of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which was to encourage
political participation of youth.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to popular belief, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was not a
narrowly tailored response to the increasing youth activism and
opposition to the Vietnam War in the 1960s. The statements made by
legislators debating the Amendment, the Amendment's textual
similarities to other anti-discrimination amendments, and judicial
interpretation in the years following its enactment all suggest that the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment was written as an anti-discrimination
amendment similar to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
228. See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 365
(M.D.N.C. 2014) (noting that all the Twenty-Sixth Amendment cases cited to the
court had been brought as class actions).
229. See supra Part II.C.2. (discussing the relevant legislative history of VIVA to
demonstrate the discriminatory intent required to assert a constitutional claim).
230. See supra Part II.C.1. (demonstrating disproportionate impact by arguing that
students have historically had trouble obtaining the types of identification required
under the North Carolina voter law).
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THE YOUNG AND THE RESTLESS
As an anti-discrimination amendment, it has the power to not only
invalidate legislation that explicitly distinguishes young and student
voters from other classes of voters, but also to nullify facially neutral
legislation that was enacted with the purpose of frustrating the ability
of young voters to participate in the franchise.
Similar to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment should trigger strict scrutiny when challengers can
show that facially neutral legislation or official action was undertaken
with discriminatory intent. Those claiming a Twenty-Sixth
Amendment violation can demonstrate a discriminatory purpose
through the totality of the circumstances surrounding the legislation
or action, including possible disproportionate effects, relevant
background and legislative history, statements of officials, and other
events surrounding the enactment of the legislation. Challengers do
not need to show that the frustration of the youth vote was the
primary purpose of the legislation or action, but they should show
that it was a motivating factor behind the legislation or action. If
those claiming a Twenty-Sixth Amendment violation can illustrate a
discriminatory purpose through the totality of the circumstances, the
court should apply strict scrutiny and invalidate the legislation or
action unless the state can show it serves a compelling state interest
and is narrowly tailored toward that interest.
North Carolina's Voter Information Verification Act (VIVA) was
enacted with a discriminatory purpose. By placing fixed registration
periods for out-of-state licenses and prohibiting the use of student IDs,
VIVA places extra burdens on a group that is likely to have inflexible
schedules, lack experience with voting procedures, and has a history of
political powerlessness. By eliminating teenage preregistration, VIVA
discarded a straightforward program that merely added teenagers to
the voter rolls the moment they turned eighteen. Eradication of the
programs appears to bear no relation to the issue of in-person voter
fraud and demonstrates a lack of concern for the ability of new voters
to register to vote. The relocation of several college polling stations
surrounding VIVA's enactment further evidences an attempt to
impede student voting. Additionally, the legislation's temporal
proximity to the Shelby County decision, coupled with the strong
influence of young voters in recent years, suggest hat VIVA's restrictive
provisions were intended to fence-out young and student voters.
Despite the low rate of in-person voter fraud, courts have generally
recognized the prevention of voter fraud as a compelling interest.
North Carolina would likely be successful in this assertion. However,
VIVA's provisions are so out of proportion with the relatively low risk
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of voter fraud that the legislation should fail strict scrutiny because it
is not "narrowly tailored" to the prevention of voter fraud.
Young and student voters seeking to challenge similar voting laws
in other states can use the North Carolina example as a guide in
structuring their own arguments. While North Carolina's laws are
particularly restrictive, the new voting laws enacted in many states
may be susceptible to a Twenty-Sixth Amendment challenge.
